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By CHARLES J. MORRISt
C OLLECTIVE BARGAINING has arrived. I was fairly sure of it a
couple of years ago when I saw' John Dunlop's now famous grouping
of collective bargaining with such other successful and distinctive Ameri-
can institutions as the family farm, our system of higher education, and
our constitutional government of checks and balances.' But I knew posi-
tively that collective bargaining had really arrived-and that it was here
to stay-when it was adopted by that most "American" of all institutions,
organized baseball. Just nine days before the opening of this year's exhibi-
tion season, the Major League Baseball Players' Association, an unaffiliated
labor union, concluded around-the-clock negotiations with the club own-
ers and reached a settlement on pensions and other benefits, thus averting
a general strike.' That truly would have been a national emergency! Imagine
a prolonged strike of big league ball players and its effect on the American
way of life. The 1966 machinists' strike of five major airlines pales by
comparison.
The baseball players were only following a path that had been marked
for them by their colleagues in professional football. It had become a com-
mon path, now well traveled by school teachers, engineers, garbage collec-
tors, bank employees and even policemen, to mention just a few of the
newcomers to the ranks of organized labor. Collective bargaining has never
been so popular, notwithstanding the public's impatience with strikes-
dock strikes, airline strikes, teachers' strikes, and all the rest. The institution
of collective bargaining, which developed many decades ago on the rail-
roads, now determines wages and conditions of employment for millions
of workers in almost every type of occupation and in every industry,
public' as well as private.
Generally, the institution works, and works well. But occasionally it fal-
*These remarks represent Professor Morris' preliminary comments, which are especially perti-
nent to the topic discussed at the symposium. The remainder of his article, containing a detailed
analysis of proposed procedural reform in labor law, applicable to both the Labor-Management
Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act, will appear as a leading article in the next issue of the
Journal. See Editor's Note, p. 436 infra.
t B.A., Temple University; J. D., Columbia University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University.
I Raskin and Dunlop, Two Views of Collective Bargaining in CHALLENGES To COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 172 (ed. L. Ulman 1967).
2 N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1969, at 50, col. 1.
a See Morris, Public Policy and the Law Relating to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service,
22 Sw. L. J. 585 (1968).
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ters, and sometimes it breaks down entirely, with consequent damage to
the public welfare and the nation's economy. Usually, this damage is only
temporary, and a strike-bound industry of one year becomes a booming
industry of the next. This is not to minimize the impact of strikes on the
non-participating public, the market position or the inflationary spiral,
for a finely tuned economy cannot help but suffer from unnecessary or
prolonged work stoppages. But it would be folly to assume, at this point
in time, that legislation can be devised to make the American economy
absolutely strike-proof. Aside from the fact that such laws would have to
provide for rigid governmental controls and probably police-state enforce-
ment, it is questionable whether, in the long run, we would want an
economy wholly devoid of strikes even if it were attainable. The collective
action of a strike, either potential or in being, might be so vital to the
collective bargaining process, and so compatible with the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and assembly that the strike as an institution
should perhaps be considered inextricably woven into the fabric of the
American economy." Nevertheless, efforts can and should be made to re-
duce the incidence of strikes, especially where vital public services are
affected.
Perhaps the day will come when a total substitute for the strike can
be found. For such a substitute to be suitable, at least according to exist-
ing values in our economic society, it must preserve the bilateral participa-
tion which is characteristic of present day collective bargaining. It should
also provide a method for adjusting wages and conditions appropriate to
the unique requirements of particular groups of employees and employers.
Moreover, it should achieve this without damaging the public interest and
without seriously interfering with the relative freedom which still dis-
tinguishes this country's system of economic enterprise. Not one of the
current legislative proposals, nor any other plan of which I am aware, meets
all of these conditions
Rather than tilt at windmills in an effort to devise a substitute for
strikes, I shall concentrate instead upon another broad set of problems:
The procedural inadequacies in the existing federal regulation of labor-
management relations. Though mindful of the air transport emphasis fea-
tured in this symposium, I shall deliberately resist the temptation to treat
airline labor relations as sui generis. Airline labor problems will, of course,
be included in this paper, but problems in this single industry can neither
be viewed nor solved in isolation. I share that opinion which holds that
a substantial factor common to many of the trouble spots in airline labor
relations is the procedural insufficiency of the Railway Labor Act. How-
ever, I do not recommend repealing that Act nor removing the airlines
from its coverage. Rather, I recommend the development of a new pro-
cedural approach to enforcement of the substantive provisions of the Act,
4 Id. at 591.
'E.g., Holland-S. 140, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Griffin--E. 103, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); javits-Kuchel-S. 1456, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Smathers-S. 176, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); Pickle-H.R. 5683, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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but only as one part of a general revision in the administration and en-
forcement of all of the basic federal labor statutes.
Before discussing such a far-reaching proposal, I want to comment
briefly on another area which I agree is also in need of legislative revision
-the matter of handling so-called "emergency disputes." I know that
some of my symposium colleagues will give this important subject a higher
priority, but time and my own choice of a primary topic will limit my
remarks on this subject.
I acknowledge that there is a need for more flexible statutory machinery
to aid in the settlement of emergency disputes. Ben Aaron has accurately
observed that "[c]oncocting panaceas for emergency disputes is a popular
indoor sport in this country, and.., one does not have to be an expert to
play." I shall be neither an expert nor a player, for I am not ready to
add any new devices to the arsenal of weapons already proposed by numer-
ous commentators. I personally favor the arsenal-of-weapons approach, but
there are some things I would not include in the President's arsenal,
specifically: Compulsory arbitration, seizure or the non-stoppage strike.'
These devices are not compatible with traditional concepts of collective
bargaining, and I am not prepared to suggest abandonment of the basic
element of collective bargaining in either the airline industry or in any
other industry. Of course, there may be some strikes where hardship on
the public would be so great that settlement must be imposed by outside
intervention rather than by allowing economic combat to run its normal
course. But such disputes are not common, and when they do occur it may
be less damaging to our economic institutions to have them adjusted on an
ad hoc basis by congressional action, as was the case in the Locomotive
Firemen's dispute which was submitted to arbitration by special Act of
Congress.8 In most emergency disputes, however, mediation, fact-finding,
limited intervention by the President and temporary injunctive relief
through the courts-used singly or in combination-should suffice.
Contrary to the views of some prophets of doom, there is evidence that
mature and responsible collective bargaining is more often the rule than
the exception, and that when left to their own devices, unions and em-
ployers generally do settle their disputes without inflicting any lasting
damage upon the economy. It is noteworthy that Taft-Hartley emergency
procedures were invoked only six times in the last five years, and that
resort to Railway Labor Act emergency procedures has dropped to a third
of the previous frequency.! Nevertheless, as Mr. Nixon recently noted,"0
the President should have additional options in dealing with national
emergency disputes. Whatever options Congress chooses to give him,
they should be available for use in any national emergency dispute regard-
6 Aaron, Emergency Dispute Settlements, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW
DEVELOPMENTS-1967, 185, 199 (1967).
'For a description of these devices, see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
270-97 (1968).
8Act of August 28, 1964, 77 Stat. 132, 45 U.S.C. 157 (1964). Noted in 17 LAB. L.J. 671
(1966). Cf. Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963).
56 SEc. LABOR ANN. REP. 23 (1969).
'070 Lab. Rel. 197 (1969).
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less of whether the immediate participants are operating under the Rail-
way Labor Act or the Taft-Hartley Act. For these purposes there is no
relevant distinction between a maritime strike and an airline strike. The
same arsenal of weapons should be available to the President for use under
either statute.
EDITOR'S NOTE
Because of the scope, length and depth of Professor Morris' paper, and
the space limitations of this issue, the remaining and major portion of the
paper will be published as a leading article in the next issue of the Journal.
In that article, Professor Morris explores the common core of substantive
rights and duties which the Railway Labor Act and the Labor-Management
Relations Act provide. He concludes that the basic legal pattern which
governs the collective bargaining relationship of employers, unions and
employees in the United States is firmly set and not likely to be changed
in the foreseeable future, save for minor loophole-closing adjustments. He
finds, however, that the existing procedural machinery available for ad-
ministering and enforcing the substantive labor law is a maze of conflict-
ing and overlapping jurisdictions, quite inadequate to cope with present
day realities in the industrial community. Regarding the Railway Labor
Act, be stresses the absence of centralized and uniform decision making,
the conflicting jurisdiction of the several tribunals which operate under the
Act, inadequacies in representation procedures employed by the Na-
tional Mediation Board and the need for a "general counsel," particularly
to provide assistance to individual employees in implementing the doctrine
of fair representation. Focusing upon the procedural deficiencies of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, Professor Morris discusses the periodic
tendency of the National Labor Relations Board to swing back and forth
in many key decisions in response to changes in political administrations.
He explores the reasons why widespread voluntary compliance with the
Act has not been achieved and why NLRB remedies are so often ineffective.
He also describes the serious conflict in jurisdiction which exists between
the Labor Board and arbitrators and courts concerning the interpretation
and enforcement of collective bargaining contracts. Professor Morris feels
this conflict is particularly serious in the law of fair representation.
According to the author, the foregoing and other procedural objections
point to a tentative conclusion-at least working hypothesis-that Con-
gress should establish a constitutional labor court to assume jurisdiction
over enforcement and interpretation of the substantive rights and duties
of the Railway Labor Act and the Labor-Management Relations Act. He
suggests the retention of the NLRB for representation cases, but with
an expanded jurisdiction to cover also determination of representation
under the Railway Labor Act. He includes in the plan an Office of Gen-
eral Counsel, or its equivalent, for the presentation of both NLRA and
RLA complaint cases, although be would not preclude interested parties
from bringing direct actions. The National Mediation Board and the Fed-
[Vol. 3 5
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eral Mediation and Conciliation Service, merged into a single agency, would
continue to exercise the mediation functions authorized by the respective
statutes. The plan does not propose to disturb the relationship of the courts
to the arbitration process.
Professor Morris believes that the time is ripe for major procedural re-
form in American labor law, and the Board of Editors shares his hope
that the proposed plan will stimulate serious efforts to effect changes that
will transcend the narrow self-interest which has too often characterized
labor legislation in the past.
